The on-going crisis in Syria helps Responsibility to Protect (R2P) analysts identify what evidence scholars and policymakers base judgements of a 'manifest failing' on. This is particularly relevant as the multifaceted crisis in Syria underlines the complexity and confusion that scholars and policymakers face when analysing overlap between atrocity crimes and armed conflict. The article draws on interdisciplinary research into mass violence in order to put forward five key indicators of a 'manifest failing' and applies them to Syria: i) government intentions, ii) weapons used, iii) death toll, iv) number of people displaced, and v) the intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and the elderly. In so doing, the article contributes to an emerging research agenda which may aid policymakers and scholars in their assessment of a 'manifest failing' but also has scope for helping those outside government to hold decision makers to account by creating a framework against which political [in]action can be judged.
Introduction
'Research on the concept of manifest failure and its relationship to R2P is relatively new, even within the burgeoning literature that now exists on R2P itself'. But what constitutes a 'manifest failing? The phrase was introduced in the final drafting stage of the WSOD in order to replace the terminology 'unable or unwilling', but the WSOD offers little to guide decision makers in determining when a state is 'manifestly failing'. Although 2015 will mark the tenth anniversary of the WSOD, the above statement begins to highlight that despite the abundance of literature produced on the Responsibility to Protect, the concept of 'manifest failure' remains overlooked and under researched. 4 It may be claimed that the phrase is so transparent that there is no need for clarity; after all, the word manifest means 'evident to the eye, mind, or judgement; obvious'. 5 But when this understanding is applied to the assessment of whether a host state is 'manifestly failing' to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, what evidence is required? If it is the case that proof of one of the four crimes being carried out is enough to warrant a pillar three response, then the requirement of a 'manifest failing' would not be needed. Moreover, from a legal perspective, the killing of just one person or a small group of people, for example a group of hostages, could constitute genocide, but this would not mean that the host state has 'manifestly failed' in its R2P. 6 It is important therefore to consider that the most controversial pillar of the R2P (which includes wide range of non-coercive response measures under
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter as well as coercive measures under Chapter VII 7 ) is grounded, in part, on an ambiguous phrase.
The question of what constitutes a 'manifest failing' feeds into an important debate regarding 'which humanitarian crises justify international moral action and which do not?' 8 Despite the fact that the WSOD focuses on just four crimes, Robert Pape analyses twentythree examples of mass atrocity crimes since 1990 and claims that the current R2P framework would demand an intervention in all of them, which, for Pape, sets the bar too low. 9 At the same time, he argues that only intervening to prevent genocide would set the bar too high with an intervention in just three cases. 10 As a result he sets out a 'pragmatic humanitarian intervention approach' based on three requirements (discussed below) as an alternative which would have called for intervention in seven of the twenty-three cases analysed. 11 Whilst this author is sympathetic to Pape's middle-ground position, it seems he has not considered that the requirement of a 'manifest failing' (a phrase which he never uses 12 ) introduced a pragmatic element into the R2P which, even if one accepts his logic, renders his new approach redundant. Yes, legitimate questions need to be considered concerning whether a small scale example of an R2P crime could occur without a 'manifest failing' taking place: ' [w]hat kind of war crime?' and '[w]hat kind of ethnic cleansing?' requires international action. 13 The problem is that in failing to address the issue of a 'manifest failing', Pape fails to acknowledge that his line of enquiry can be factored into the current R2P framework. 14 It is important to answer two questions at the outset. First, why focus on Syria? In many ways, Syria defines the counter-position to this article in that scholars may simply claim that it is obvious that the regime has failed in its R2P. Mike Abramowitz captures this sentiment when he states, ' [t] here is no question that Syria today represents perhaps the most glaring failure to protect civilians from the worst, an R2P failure of the first order; with 100,000 deaths and clear cases of massacres and other crimes against humanity'. 15 Although this author does not disagree with this statement, the focus on death toll, which takes centre stage in mainstream media analysis, is just one indicator of a 'manifest failing' and it is important that scholars provide a more informed understanding by analysing the complexities involved. In addition to this it is important to note that this article does not aim to imply that there have been explicit UN Security Council debates over whether the Syrian regime is 'manifestly failing'. The point here is that it is important to learn lessons from this 'R2P failure of the fist order'. A part of this should be that the crisis helps us to identify what evidence we base judgements of a 'manifest failing' on. More importantly, it highlights the need to get to grips with the confusion and chaos that academics and policymakers face when analysing the issue of a 'manifest failing' within the context of warfare. 16 This is a key component highlighted in the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's fifth report on R2P
(since 2009) as he highlights the need to navigate the 'overlap' between 'armed conflict' and 'atrocity crimes'.
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The second question is: why choose these five indicators? As will be demonstrated throughout this paper, the indicators are drawn from interdisciplinary research into mass violence. Although there is much disagreement on the causes of crimes such as genocide, the question of what constitutes a 'manifest failing' is a qualitatively different task and it is important to separate these two lines of enquiry. Against this backdrop, the article identifies five key indicators: i) government intentions, ii) weapons used, iii) death toll, iv) number of people displaced, and v) the intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and the elderly. The aim here is not to create the 'Holy Grail' framework that policymakers and scholars will turn to immediately. Instead, the intention is to provide a 'common reference within which argumentation can take place' for at present there is none. 18 Let us remember that the identification of between three and seven criteria (this has changed over time) has been used to guide assessments of what constitutes a Just War from St. Aquinas to present day. 19 The article is structured in six parts. The first section explains the current UN approach to highlight its strengths and weaknesses and ultimately argues that indicators are needed. The analysis then shifts its attention to focus on Syria with one section devoted to each of the five indicators identified above. The conclusion draws the main points together whilst raising further issues and questions that need to be addressed as this research agenda continues to grow.
The UN approach
Paragraph 139 of the WSOD sets out the following commitment which highlights that a wide range of coercive and non-coercive measures are available to the UN under Chapters VI, VII and VIII as it responds in a 'timely and decisive manner' on a 'case-by-case basis' should a national authority 'manifestly fail' in its R2P:
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared, to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner through the Security Council in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
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The key aspect to consider is that the ambiguity that surrounds a 'manifest failing' goes hand in hand with the 'case-by-case' approach and together these have two significant strengths.
The first is the ambiguous nature of the phrase 'manifest failing' itself. To put this in context let us consider the UN Charter. As Paul Kennedy, and indeed many others have highlighted, the Charter was intentionally designed using 'language that was adaptable enough to allow application under unforeseen circumstances in years to come'. 21 In other words, if guidelines are too rigid, then ultimately this hinders rather than helps the application of policies. Against the backdrop of the League of Nations Covenant, flexibility was seen to be a key component of constructing a more durable system of governance at the international level. Thus, it could be argued that 'manifest failing' is another example of artful language which enables the UN to respond on a 'case-by-case' basis -this is its second strength -in that it is widely accepted that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' approach. 22 Quite simply, mass atrocity crimes are far too complex for any single framework to provide a solution. For example, the debates over the causes of genocide alone highlight that no one approach can provide the silver bullet. 23 Indeed, in the recent assessment of Syria, Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the UN stated, 'there is no one size fits all solution, no algorithm, nor should there be.' 24 In so doing, Power re-stated the sentiment expressed by the UN Secretary-General in that trying to establish a single framework would be both a mistake and counterproductive.
Although this UN perspective is the dominant view found in the discourse, there are a number of issues that need to be thought through. First, any attempt to create a 'one-size-fitsall' approach is flawed but is important to differentiate between the interpretation of the R2P and the application of it. Following the intervention in Libya and the non-intervention in The intention here is not dismiss or downplay the need for flexibility but instead to draw attention to one aspect that has not been raised in the discourse as ambiguity aids flexibility but this also serves great power manipulation. This was famously played out in the context of the Rwandan genocide as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5) avoided using the word genocide to distance themselves from the responsibilities set out in the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 27 This is not to say that the actors involved manipulated the ambiguity inherent in the Genocide Convention but simply to draw attention to the idea that words matter. For example, in relation to Libya it has been argued that Conservatives in the Canadian government banned the use of the phrase R2P even though they supported the intervention so as not to set a precedent for the future (which some have claimed is broadly in line with the Western position). 28 More recently, regarding Syria, it has been argued that the U.S., used 'vague rhetoric' as part of a concerted White House effort to avoid taking a clear position on U.S. policy toward Syria's 2-year old civil war'. 29 When one considers the ambiguity that surrounds the phrase 'manifest failing' on one hand and the fact that so little attention is paid to it on the other, this facilitates the ability of states to distance themselves from their responsibilities. Thus, the hope is that this emerging research agenda may in time help those outside government to hold decision makers to account by creating a framework against which political [in]action can be judged. At the very least, and to return to Pape, an awareness of the issue is needed. For example, a senior peace-keeping official at the UN admitted that it was only after the Rwandan genocide had taken place that he found out that the Genocide Convention existed. 30 This raises the idea that it is difficult to even know the implications that stem from narratives that are constructed both consciously and unconsciously. 31 A final point is that even on a case-by-case basis states will have to appeal to something in order to make the case that a threshold has been passed. To put this into context let us consider President Barack Obama's justification for the intervention in Libya in 2011:
In the face of the world's condemnation, Qaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a military campaign against the Libyan people. Innocent people were targeted for killing. Hospitals and ambulances were attacked. Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and killed. Supplies of food and fuel were choked off. Water for hundreds of thousands of people in Misurata was shut off. Cities and towns were shelled, mosques were destroyed, and apartment buildings reduced to rubble. Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assaults from the air. Confronted by this brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis, I ordered warships into the Mediterranean.
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At no point does President Obama use the phrase 'manifest failing' yet the underlying argument is that what was tolerated yesterday cannot be tolerated today. In other words, the escalation in violence in both qualitative and quantitative terms signifies that a line has been crossed -a threshold passed -thus implying that the Libyan regime had 'manifestly failed'. Accordingly, Colonel Qaddafi 'forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and created a serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and protection'. 33 In much the same way, when one surveys the history of the recent violence in Syria, it is clear that there are pivotal qualitative and quantitative developments which led actors to make the case that a 'manifest failing' has occurred.
To bring this section to a close it is important to explain the argument put forward here. Indeed, the reader may reject the idea of establishing a new research agenda on the grounds that it does not matter what phrase is used, the decision to react is a political choice based on things other than a 'manifest failing', such as the national interest, sovereignty, and the complexities of intervention. 34 Therefore, we should not get bogged down in a research agenda which has no impact on the decision making process and should focus instead on issues such as UN reform. 35 To be clear, this paper does not argue that aspects such as the national interest et al, are not important, and if a reminder of power politics were needed then the on-going crisis in Syria is a perfect example. However, the question of what constitutes a 'manifest failing' is another contributing factor because when one analyses the narrative that surrounds any R2P crisis one can see a debate over threshold. Whether this is framed in terms of illegitimacy, irresponsibility, an escalation in violence, 'unable or unwilling', or a 'manifest failing', the underlying logic is that of threshold: a line has been crossed in that what was tolerated yesterday cannot be today and action has to be taken. It is a mistake therefore to claim that the meaning of 'manifest failure' does not matter because this perspective fails to recognise that within the current R2P framework it represents the issue of threshold. With this in mind, this article now shifts its focus to analysing i) government intentions, ii) death toll, iii) displacement of people, iv) the intentional targeting of children, women, and the elderly, and v) weapons used, as key indicators of a 'manifest failing' in Syria.
Syria
As Raymond Hinnebusch explains, within eleven years of Bashar al-Assad assuming power in Syria his attempt to 'modernize authoritarianism' had collapsed into turmoil. 36 Since then, the conflict has become more multifaceted needing to be understood within the regional context of 'complex geo-strategic relationships' which 'have fed into the decisions within the UN Security Council'. 37 
Government intentions
When assessing whether a state has 'manifestly failed' in its R2P, it is difficult to imagine a starting point other than the role of the government itself. Historically, regime type has been a key focal point but with a lack of consensus on this issue, 44 Kosovo, the historical policy record of Slobodan Milosevic obviously shaped the decision making process whilst Qaddafi's explicit threats to destroy his own citizens helped create a pro-R2P consensus over Libya. However, as perpetrator regimes learn from one another it will become more and more difficult to assess the role of the government which means that analysts may have to become more dependent on other indicators.
Death toll
The more people killed the more one would expect that the government is actively participating in the violence or is unable to prevent it which aligns itself with the original focus on 'unable or unwilling'. Either way, this may constitute a 'manifest failing' depending on how many civilians have been killed. In Benjamin Valentino's seminal study on mass violence, the author sets out a clear and concise measure 'at least fifty thousand deaths over the course of five or fewer years'.
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The reason for this is that it helps demonstrate that a systematic process of mass murder has taken place. The arbitrary nature of Valentino's measurement means that if 49, 999 people were killed this would fall short of the classification put forward. Of course, Valentino is aware of this, and furthermore, acknowledges that 'such a definition does not adequately capture the threat to human diversity posed by attacks against smaller groups'. 62 This has led to authors such as Adam Jones to claim that we should not seek to establish a precise measurement but acknowledge that 'tens or hundreds of thousands' of victims passes a threshold but that also we need to factor in 'relative group size' which is particularly relevant when considering the crime of genocide. 63 Commissioner Navi Pillay stated '[t]he number of casualties is much higher than we expected, and is truly shocking'. 66 She also pointed out that as the violence in Syria had not let-up since the end of November, then logically, the death-toll was in fact even higher in January 2013 than the total given in the report. For example, on January 10 th UK Foreign
Secretary William
Hague briefed Parliament claiming '1,000 civilians were reportedly killed in one six-day period over Christmas'. 67 Tragically, the killing in 2013 has only escalated with 'most of these casualties believed to be civilians' 68 , and the current death estimated to be 115.000 including 47.000 Assad loyalist fighters and 23.000 rebels. 69 Although the Syrian regime is not responsible for all those killed, and we have no way of knowing exactly who has killed who, to juxtapose these statistics with the role of the government analysis above, it is important to bear in mind that the regime is overwhelmingly responsible for the number of civilians killed. The fact that the Syrian crisis has surpassed even Valentino's high threshold does allows us to further substantiate the case that the Syrian regime has 'manifestly failed' but this does not overcome the issue of whether a quantifiable death toll indicator should be established for future assessments.
To put these approaches into a practical context consider that the genocide in Srebrenica is captured by Bellamy's measurement but not Valentino's. This may lead one to argue that the fifty thousand threshold is too high but as Bellamy's approach identifies 103 episodes of mass atrocity between 1945 and 2010 this could be considered too low. Indeed, if this latter measure were accepted the number of cases would give weight to Pape's claim that the 'R2P sets the bar for intervention so low that virtually every instance of anarchy or tyranny-or indeed, every potential instance-represents an opportunity for the international community to violate the sovereignty of states'. 70 However, this statement is problematic because as aforementioned the third pillar of the R2P incorporates more than just military intervention and alternative response measures should not be overlooked. 71 Furthermore,
Pape actually claims that 'mass homicide' in which 'thousands have died and thousands more are likely to die' should act as one of the three indicators for a pragmatic intervention, the others being a 'viable plan' and 'workable strategy'.
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The trouble here is not Pape's line of thinking but that it is difficult to see why these factors cannot be incorporated into the current R2P framework which embodies a long history of prudence and pragmatism. 73 To explain, Pape's death toll indicator, 'thousands have died and thousands more likely to die', has notable purchase and can help determine when a 'manifest failing's is taking place. First, it does not draw an arbitrary quantitative line in the sand in the same way that Valentino's does. Second, it captures the value of Valentino's approach in that helps us demonstrate that a systematic on-going murderous process is taking place which indicates that 'tens of thousands' may die. Third, it means that we do not have to wait until tens of thousands of bodies pile up before a pillar three response can be considered (which is precisely what happened in the context of Qaddafi). On that point it is important to note that the drafters chose the phrase 'manifest failing' rather than 'manifest failure' precisely because they wanted to highlight this should be identified as a on-going process (manifest failing) so that we do not have to wait until the point that the crime is indeed over (manifest failure). 74 Fourth, it would capture 'genocidal massacres' such as Srebrenica whereas
Valentino and Jones' approaches would not. 75 It is with this in mind that this author upholds
Pape's death toll indicator of 'thousands dead and thousands more likely to die' as an element of pragmatism but claims that this should be incorporated into the current R2P framework rather than form the basis of a new approach.
Displacement of people
To be clear, the R2P was not set up to address the problem of internally displaced people (IDP) and refugees. However, if genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing have been committed, the premise here is that an analysis of IDP and refugees helps analysts to gain an understanding of whether the government is 'manifestly failing' to fulfil both its internal and external responsibilities. It is important to recall that the Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) re-characterized sovereignty 'from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties'.
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It was claimed that '[t]hinking of sovereignty as responsibility...implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. 77 Accordingly, mass IDP and refugee movements help demonstrate that the government is failing in its internal responsibility to protect the safety and welfare of citizens as well as its external responsibility as refugees destabilise regional order.
The internal/external dimension was put into context by the Commission of Inquiry into Syria as it stated that areas with high number of IDP are particularly prone to hostilities as coping mechanisms amongst the population collapse thereby also increasing the number of refugees. 78 To give an overview, in January 2013, it was estimated that there were two million IDP in Syria and 'an estimated 671, 262 Syrian refugees were present in five neighbouring countries and North Africa, further destabilizing the region, both economically and politically'. 79 Addressing the refugee crisis Melissa Fleming, Chief Spokeswoman for the United Nations Refugee Agency claimed 'it has gone from bad to worse to verging on horrific, I mean, what civilians are going through in this conflict is absolutely dramatic….it is a very very dramatic situation and has gotten worse'. 80 Since this statement was made, the number of IDP has risen to an estimated 6 million with 2 million refugees. 81 It seems regional tensions have surpassed breaking point, for example, on the Turkish Syrian border refugee camps are full and security is failing. 82 Quite simply, the government has not only failed to create a safe security environment domestically but has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity which have played major role in escalating the IDP and refugee crisis. In relation to this indicator, it seems incomprehensible that anyone would argue that the Syrian regime has not 'manifestly failed'.
The death toll in any crisis will remain the 'headline grabber'; however, the displacement of people provides another strong indicator because it helps us gauge whether the host state is failing in its internal and external responsibilities. The latter is often neglected yet extremely important. For example, in relation to the Rwandan genocide the ICISS stated, '[i]ts consequence was not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for Rwanda: the genocide destabilized the entire Great Lakes region and continues to do so'. 83 To return to the qualitative and quantitative dimension discussed in relation to death toll, one may question exactly how many people have to be displaced before we can begin to discuss this in relation to a 'manifest failing'? However, unlike death toll, no refugee crisis is in itself large enough to trigger a third pillar action (one of the four crimes would also have to be carried out). The intention therefore is to simply highlight that this is another important factor that we should incorporate into any judgement of whether the government in question has 'manifestly failed'.
Weapons of choice
Which weapons are being used to carry out the violence? The answer to this question is important as it helps assessments of what the state is doing. Quite simply, if government weaponry is being used in systematic manner (rather than a rebel group capturing and using some government artillery) then this implies that the government is an active participant in the mass violence and is thus obviously failing in its R2P.
The attack on Homs in February 2012 represented a seismic shift in the violence as the city came under siege from heavy weaponry. Comparable thresholds, such as Srebrenica, began to be used in the discourse as analysts claimed that the violence equalled unacceptable levels. 84 In June 2012, Sausan Ghosheh, the spokesperson for the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, stated that UN observers in Homs 'reported heavy fighting in Rastan and Talbiseh, north of the city, with artillery and mortar shelling, as well as firing from helicopters, machine guns and smaller arms'. 85 The statement captures two key components in any assessment as it draws attention to the disproportional escalation in violence and the role of the government. Both of which became even more prominent with the use of scud missiles.
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Whilst anti-Government armed groups have also used anti-tank and anti-air craft missiles, it is important to stress that these are limited in 'quality and quantity'. 87 This reaffirms the idea that the Syrian government bears overwhelming responsibility precisely because it was government weaponry that was used.
Long rumored reports on the potential use of chemical weapons became more prominent as the government's control weakened. 88 In a Chatham House publication in January 2013, Steve Clemons touched on many key issues here when he stated: illustrate that the weapons used in a conflict may have substantial purchase when attempting to demonstrate that a 'manifest failing' is taking place.
Targeting civilians: especially women, children and the elderly
The systematic targeting of civilians implies that a policy has been forged. Accordingly the government is either responsible for the plan being formulated or is incapable of preventing non-state actors from implementing this strategy. Either way, a substantive case can be made that the host state is 'manifestly failing' in its R2P but the premise here is that this failing is most obvious when vulnerable groups are targeted. In Jacques Sémelin's accomplished analysis on the dynamics of mass murder the author claims that '[a] considerable qualitative leap is taken when the target widens to include, women, children, and elderly people'. 93 The point is not to downplay attacks on other civilians but to highlight that the gravity and character of the crime takes on another qualitative dimension when vulnerable groups are targeted. This is not to suggest that such groups should be viewed as passive actors that have no agency but instead to highlight that certain groups are more vulnerable in war than others. 94 Therefore, when the host state fails to protect these groups, or if it is the perpetrator itself, then it is difficult to conceive of a clearer indicator of a 'manifest failing', especially in relation to the targeting of children.
In Syria, the high number of children killed stems from a lethal cocktail of intentional targeting, indiscriminate killing, and the destruction of healthcare provisions. It is important to bear in mind that 'the escalation point for the uprising in Syria was the arrest and torture of fifteen school children for spray painting anti-government graffiti on a wall in Daraa'. 
Conclusion
This article has analysed the discourse on Syria and drawn on interdisciplinary research in to mass violence in order to identify five key indicators of a 'manifest failing': i) government intentions, ii) weapons used, iii) death toll, iv) number of people displaced, and v) the intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and the elderly. When one begins to put these five jig saw pieces together one can at least begin to make sense of, and substantiate, the idea that the Syrian regime has 'manifestly failed' in its R2P. Although antigovernment forces should also be held account, it is evident that the Syrian regime bears overwhelming responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed which has seen an estimated 115.000 people killed, a third of the country displaced, and widespread indiscriminate killing of civilians including children. Although voices calling for a third pillar response have been around since at least February 2012, 108 this author would argue that there is now an irrefutable body of evidence that can be put forward in order to demonstrate that the Syrian regime has 'manifestly failed'. The worrying complexity is that without such evidence we cannot prove a 'manifest failing' has taken place. Undoubtedly, this raises the troubling reality that a pillar three action, such as a humanitarian intervention, may be most effective if it is conducted earlier rather than later. 109 But with very little consensus on this issue the R2P process as it stands means that the international community has to first agree on and then react to a 'manifest failing'.
Of course, there are never going to be criteria which will allow analysts to scientifically pinpoint the precise moment at which a 'manifest failing' occurs. Moreover, a level of flexibility is needed so that the rules do not become too rigid for practical use on a case by case basis. However, to return to the logic that underpins Just War Theory, the intention here is to provide a 'common reference within which argumentation can take place'
for at present there is none. 110 The hope is that through further research a more comprehensive framework can be established which aids the assessment of other case studies.
Future research needs to address questions and issues which could not be factored in to this article. In particular, the idea of scaling needs to be addressed. This author's position is that not all five indicators have to be present for a 'manifest failing' to take place, for example, the displacement of people is less important than death toll or government intentions.
Furthermore, there may be other indicators, for example, systematic sexual violence, which may be incorporated as comparative studies are done, and interdisciplinary perspectives put forward. Finally, there are quantitative and qualitative dimensions embodied in these five indicators which need to be brought to the fore, again, interdisciplinary research will help
here. But at the very least, the five indicators provide a framework to aid further debate and analysis. When one considers that the lives of potentially millions of people may depend on the third pillar of the R2P being triggered, the importance of this issue cannot be overstated.
Indeed, as the crisis in Syria continues to escalate this gives further credence to the idea that an independent body should be set up to make rulings on such issues, 111 a part of which has to be whether a 'manifest failing' is taking place.
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